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Abstract: 
Family involvement in corporate governance through ownership, management, and board 
membership presents a unique dilemma for understanding the strategic impetus and costs of 
entrenchment decisions. The presence of shared family ties and the family-centered goals of firm 
principals call to question the applicability of extant agency arguments regarding the nature and 
antecedents of managerial entrenchment. Exploring this, we develop and test a model of family 
firm-specific determinants (i.e., family ownership and family's involvement in management and 
governance) of entrenchment in publicly traded firms by drawing upon principal-principal 
agency theory. Findings of the empirical analysis of family owned S&P 500 firms suggest family 
firms are motivated to entrench managers when doing so supports the pursuit of family-centric 
goals. However, the extent to which entrenchment supports such goals varies at different levels 
of family ownership. 
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Article: 
Introduction 
Broadly defined, entrenchment encompasses phenomena that protect managers against 
disciplinary effects of board monitoring, the threat of dismissal, and performance based 
compensation (Berger et al., 1997; pg. 1411). Extant research has illustrated that entrenchment in 
public firms with dispersed ownership is generally related to decreased stakeholder returns 
resulting from free-rider problems and a propensity for agency conflict among majority and 
minority principals (Bebchuk et al., 2009). However, this relationship becomes less clear in 
publicly traded family firms where familial associations may grant various protections for family 
owners akin to entrenchment that extant corporate governance research is not sensitive towards 
(Andres, 2008; Anderson and Reeb, 2004). Family controlled publicly traded firms are those in 
which members of the founder(s) family are officers, directors, or blockholders and allows for 
family members, either individually or as a group, to impact corporate governance (Villalonga 
and Amit, 2006, 2009). In family firms, familial influence over the firm through ownership and 
management may lead to the pursuit of particularistic goals and strategies that prioritize family 
outcomes (Chrisman et al., 2012) and direct resource investments in ways that may have unique 
impacts on shareholder wealth (Chrisman et al., 2004; Chen et al., 2013; Carney, 2005). These 
idiosyncratic goal sets represent a primary scholarly impetus for ongoing research in the strategic 
management of publicly traded family firms and call to question many of the logics underlying 
extant research on entrenchment and its outcomes in family owned firms. Specifically, while 
numerous research findings have recognized that family owners are more likely to be entrenched 
in their organizations when compared to their counterparts in non-family firms (Anderson et al., 
2003; Claessens et al., 2002), the consequences of this entrenchment and their impact on firm 
value is less clear and not obviously aligned with extant research (Villalonga and Amit, 2006). 
These potentially incongruent findings are indicative of the complexity of entrenchment 
phenomena in this context and illustrate the need for further research refining our recognition of 
the distinctiveness of entrenchment in family firms. 
The present research seeks to expand current understandings of the nature, role, and implications 
of entrenchment in family firms. In doing so, we explore the tendency towards entrenchment in 
family firms and the unique considerations for its study in ongoing discussions within this 
domain. Our findings suggest that while entrenchment may indeed be common in family firms, 
the methods and avenues used in reinforcing that entrenchment may not include the value-
diminishing governance provisions most commonly attributed to its emergence, such as those 
represented in the entrenchment index (E-index; Bebchuk et al., 2009). We posit that these 
outcomes are primarily owing to the affective nature of familial governance and the tendency of 
family owners to pursue non-economic returns (e.g. socioemotional wealth; Gómez-Mejía et al., 
2007), which are indicative of principal-principal agency conflict among family and non-family 
shareholders. 
Owing to the presence of a shared social association, entrenchment may be particularly relevant 
to the acute principal-principal agency conflict in family firms (Bebchuk et al., 2009; Morck 
et al., 1998; Renders and Gaeremynck, 2012; Klein et al., 2005; Chen et al., 2015). Such conflict 
arises as families' significant stock ownership and control over the board of directors allow them 
to pursue particularistic interests, which are likely to differ from those of non-family and 
minority shareholders (Ali et al., 2007; Maury, 2006). Indeed, some families may prioritize the 
private benefits of control (i.e., benefits appropriated by large shareholders at the expense of 
minority shareholders; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997) and the preservation of affective endowments 
to achieve noneconomic goals (Berrone et al., 2010; Chrisman et al., 2003, 2012; Gómez-Mejía 
et al., 2007) over maximizing shareholder wealth. To facilitate this, family members tend to hold 
key management and board positions which must then be protected (Block et al., 2013; Maury, 
2006). This suggests a unique predisposition towards entrenchment behaviors in family firms. 
While the distinctive governance behaviors of family firms may exhibit informal social 
dynamics, traditional entrenchment mechanisms - namely those summarized by the E-index 
(Bebchuk et al., 2009) – rely on formal contractual provisions to protect managers and directors 
from removal, or the consequences of removal, regardless of their success or competence within 
their position. We posit that entrenchment, through either formal or informal mechanisms, is 
particularly instrumental for firms pursuing family-oriented goals. These governance 
mechanisms can also entrench a controlling family by strengthening the family's ability to pursue 
non-economic and economic goals that primarily benefit family members rather than other 
shareholders. Together, this suggests entrenchment tactics may hold a distinctive role as a 
strategic option for publicly traded family firms beyond what would be expected in their non-
family counterparts. 
By analyzing publicly-traded family firms in the S&P 500 between 2002 and 2006, we 
hypothesize and find that family ownership has an inverted u-shaped relationship with family's 
involvement in management and/or the board as well as with the employment of entrenchment 
provisions. Meanwhile, family's involvement in management and/or board membership is 
negatively associated with the employment of entrenchment provisions. 
The present research seeks to contribute to the literature on family firms and corporate 
governance by enhancing our understanding of the role of entrenchment in family firms, 
particularly with regard to their propensity for incorporating idiosyncratic governance 
provisions. The present research enhances our understanding of the distinctive motivations, 
avenues, and consequences of entrenchment in publicly traded family firms, as well as how the 
unique principal-principal agency relationships in family firms may inform and clarify the 
emergence of these distinctive entrenchment behaviors. 
Theoretical overview 
Agency conflict in family firms 
Seminal agency arguments suggest that fewer agency problems emerge in firms with unified 
ownership and management; such as in family owned firms (Chrisman et al., 2004; Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976; Fama and Jensen, 1983). Alignment of interests, monitoring advantages, and 
increased concerns for shareholder wealth owing to property rights tend to mitigate some agency 
costs (Zhang et al., 2011; Chrisman et al., 2004; Schulze et al., 2001). While family governance 
may ameliorate some degree of traditional agency costs, the characteristic reciprocal altruism 
underlying it provides an avenue for distinctly familial agency conflicts to emerge (Schulze 
et al., 2002; Lubatkin et al., 2005). Specifically the salience of non-owning family principal 
demands in the development of family firm strategy creates non-permeable principal groups 
between family and non-family owners, which are vehicles for principal-principal agency 
conflict and the expropriation of wealth from minority shareholders. 
Such diverse agency concerns are particularly salient in family firms owing to the existence of 
various groups of owners and/or managers with different, and often conflicting, interests 
(Gómez-Mejía et al., 2001). Family owners and managers in family controlled corporations are 
likely to hold interests that are misaligned with those of non-family shareholders, who have less 
power due to minority ownership and less active participation in management. Hence, in publicly 
traded family firms, distinctive agency concerns tend to arise when members of the controlling 
family dominate executive management and board positions. Specifically, as family managers 
act towards the interests of the controlling family, even when doing so comes at the expense of 
minority shareholders in general (Morck and Yeung, 2003). 
In family firms, the owning family acts as a non-permeable pseudo-block holder, directing 
decisions towards those that pursue the interests of the owning family and outcomes that can 
disproportionately benefit the family and protect the private benefits of family control (Cremers 
and Nair, 2005). This creates distinctive avenues for benefit for family principals that non-family 
principals are not privy to, creating an agency context ripe for principal-principal conflict 
(Mahoney and Mahoney, 1993; Mahoney et al., 1996, 1997). While this agency conflict may not 
be grounded in guileful attempts of opportunistic deceit, it suggests a bounded reliability among 
family managers (Verbeke and Greidanus, 2009) and potential for minority wealth expropriation 
(Dharwadkar et al., 2000; Young et al., 2008). Owing to this, it is unsurprising that extant 
research shows that principal-principal agency problems tend to be more prevalent in publicly 
traded family firms (Ali et al., 2007; Chrisman et al., 2012; Miller and Le Breton-Miller, 2005; 
Villalonga and Amit, 2006). Simply put, while concentrated control simplifies the task of 
monitoring family agents, it increases the incentive and power of family owners to expropriate 
wealth from non-family shareholders (Anderson and Reeb, 2003b, 2004; Gilson and Gordon, 
2003; Johnson et al., 2000; La Porta et al., 1999); suggesting a unique incentive for entrenchment 
in family firms. 
Family ownership, family involvement, and entrenchment 
When members of the owning family hold key management and board positions, it introduces a 
social dynamic that can be a root cause of principal-principal agency conflict between family and 
non-family principals (Gilson and Gordon, 2003). As a result, unique vehicles for minority 
wealth expropriation may exist for family principals that would not be relevant in general 
contexts. In order to effectively explore these relationships, we simultaneously draw from 
complementary agency and socioemotional wealth approaches (ala. Gomez-Mejia et al., 2014; 
Gomez-Mejia et al., 2017; Miller and Le-Breton Miller, 2014) to explore the agency conflict that 
can emerge among family and non-family principal groups in distinctive ways. Examples include 
nepotism, by appointing family members and acquaintances to key positions without proper 
evaluation of qualifications, implementing strategies that allow family agendas to be followed at 
the expense of firm performance (e.g. resistance to takeovers or little/lack of investment into 
R&D; Patel and Chrisman, 2014), and engaging in related-party transactions (Young et al., 
2008). These unique behaviors of family firms are motivated, at least partially, by the tendency 
of family firms to pursue non-economic family centered goals. 
Family owners may prefer to maximize the non-economic benefits of control with not much cost 
bearing associated with private benefits, which presents a divergence from the majority of extant 
research on entrenchment motivations. For example, in large US corporations, founding families 
appear to be the blockholders whose control rights on average exceed their cash-flow rights 
(Villalonga and Amit, 2009). The discrepancy between family's control rights and ownership 
tends to exacerbate the agency problem of the expropriation of minority shareholder wealth since 
families with even low-to-medium levels of ownership bear only a fraction of the costs 
associated with the private benefits they reap (Claessens et al., 2002; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; 
Miller and Breton-Miller, 2006; Villalonga and Amit, 2006). Moreover, family firms are willing 
to accept greater performance hazard in order to preserve socioemotional wealth rooted in non-
economic goals, diminishing minority shareholder returns (Chrisman et al., 2003; Gómez-Mejía 
et al., 2007). For example, Gómez-Mejía et al. (2007) show that family firms may be willing to 
accept risk to their performance to avoid the loss of socioemotional wealth, but at the same time 
be risk averse in making other business decisions. The prioritization of these affective 
endowments – such as the preservation of family harmony, identity, dynasty, social capital, 
reputation, and ability to be altruistic toward family members and exercise family influence 
(Berrone et al., 2010; Chrisman et al., 2012; Gómez-Mejía et al., 2007, 2010) – is more salient as 
family ownership increases and elevates the family's intention to sustain family control (Chua 
et al., 1999; Gómez-Mejía et al., 2007). This suggests the presence of non-linear relationships 
between not only family ownership and entrenchment, as well as distinctive relationships 
between family ownership, family management, and family governance. 
Family owners in firms with low-to-moderate levels of family ownership desire both the 
employment of family members as managers and board members as well as their entrenchment, 
which facilitates the family's sustained influence over the business and thus the pursuit of family-
centered goals. Thereby, we posit governance provisions promoting entrenchment indirectly 
serve the purpose of protecting family owners, even in cases when family ownership is not a 
dominant force in firm governance. Additionally, the controlling family with perceptions of top 
management team benevolence rooted in family ties and acquaintances may feel compelled 
towards familial altruism by using governance provisions that protect top management team and 
board members' positions in the firm in the long-run (Cruz et al., 2010). Hence, at low-to-
moderate levels of family ownership, we posit that entrenchment provisions will become more 
common as family ownership increases. Further, family owners may perceive the benefits of 
these provisions even if they are not themselves managerial beneficiaries. Specifically, the long-
term oriented family owners with socioemotional wealth concerns (e.g. Brigham et al., 2014) 
may benefit future family managers who may not be involved in the firm yet (Sciascia et al., 
2014) but may join when they become more engrained in firm governance. As such, with low to 
moderate levels of family ownership, the family's benefit from incorporating entrenchment 
provisions should increase regardless of current levels of family involvement in management and 
without the threats of perceived nepotism that underlie principal-principal conflict in firms with 
more significant family ownership stakes (Nordqvist et al., 2014). Thus, we posit that the 
incorporation of entrenchment provisions may advance unhindered in firms with low to moderate 
levels of family ownership as the increasing rights of the family can provide more discretion and 
power to employ family members and incorporate entrenchment provisions. 
We expect the positive relationship between family ownership and the employment of family 
managers and/or directors as well as their entrenchment indicated above to reach an apex at a 
moderate level of ownership. In this case, family owners have the requisite power, authority, and 
legitimacy to exert greater influence on the firm, but are still motivated to facilitate entrenchment 
owing to their lack of dominant control. In other words, at this level, family principals are 
primarily motivated to secure and preserve control and influence, which can serve the 
multigenerational continuity of family legacy (Berrone et al., 2012), which in turn creates 
transgenerational incentives for incorporating entrenchment provisions; even if few family 
managers are to benefit from those provisions yet. In fact, family owners can achieve this goal by 
ensuring family members maintain a significant presence among governance positions, and 
protecting those positions through entrenchment provisions. As a result, we posit that the 
capacity for, and benefits from, family entrenchment are maximized at moderate levels of family 
ownership when more family members serve as managers and/or directors. 
Finally, at higher levels of family ownership, the strategic impetus of solidifying the controlling 
status of family owners is less salient, verging on redundant. Since the family already has 
substantial equity and voting rights, allowing them to exert and maintain control over the firm 
unhindered, the strategic value of entrenchment is less obvious (Arteaga and Menéndez-Requejo, 
2017), whereas the value-diminishing consequences of entrenchment remain unchanged. Hence, 
at moderate-to-high levels of family ownership, the need for explicit entrenchment provisions is 
likely to diminish as dominant family control allows owners to protect family managers without 
the need for contractual control (e.g. Firfiray et al., 2017; Luo and Chung, 2013). In such cases, 
family control is already protected and principal-principal conflict is less likely to threaten 
familial endowments as non-family principals have less power. In turn, family owners may 
prefer to hire professional non-family managers (e.g. Madison et al., 2017) for firm growth and 
higher economic returns. 
These arguments suggest that family firms have distinct tendencies, motivations, and desired 
outcomes related to managerial entrenchment. When viewed together, we argue that these 
strategic idiosyncrasies create a landscape wherein family firms may be uniquely motivated to 
populate key management and board positions with family members and entrench themselves 
within those positions in order to ensure the continued use of the firm as a vehicle for pursuing 
particularistic family-oriented objectives. However, these behaviors are hindered by both 
capability and perceived necessity. Specifically, relating back to the seminal understanding of 
entrenchment motivations (e.g. Claessens et al., 2002), we expect that the owning family exists 
as an external stakeholder, the demands of which are salient among all family actors in the firm. 
Specifically, as family ownership levels increase from low to moderate levels, we expect family 
principals to gain the power and influence necessary for placing, and entrenching, family 
members in key management and/or board positions; suggesting a positive relationship between 
family ownership and the employment of family executives as well as the incorporation of 
entrenchment provisions. However, as family ownership becomes dominant, family owners have 
the unique ability to benefit from entrenchment by circumventing agency restrictions that protect 
against expropriation by having the family serve as a de facto blockholder (Aguilera and Crespi-
Cladera, 2016; Franks et al., 2015), which diminishes the need for entrenchment provisions and 
non-owner family managers (Madison et al., 2017). Together this suggests that family ownership 
has a unique and non-linear relationship with regard to family management, board 
representation, and entrenchment. Hence: 
Hypothesis 1a 
Family ownership has an inverted u-shaped relationship with family's involvement in 
management and/or the board. 
Hypothesis 1b 
Family ownership has an inverted u-shaped relationship with the employment of entrenchment 
provisions. 
Family management and/or board membership, and entrenchment 
While family ownership has a distinct and non-linear relationship with entrenchment, the 
relationship between family management and entrenchment requires further investigation. We 
posit that, owing to the differences between family's active control through participation in 
management and the family's more passive role as a disengaged owner (Maury, 2006), family 
involvement may distinctly influence the motivations and costs of incorporating entrenchment 
provisions. According to Schulze and Gedajlovic (2010), studies have not always distinguished 
between the different effects between family ownership, management and/or governance. While 
family owners may desire to govern their firms in ways that promote family-centric outcomes 
(Chrisman et al., 2012), family managers may not possess the competencies or capabilities of 
their non-family counterparts which can limit access to valuable knowledge and human capital 
resources (Hauswald, Hack, Kellermanss, and Patzelt, 2016); threatening the sustainability of the 
firm in general. Indeed, some family owners may not be willing or able to be involved in 
management and prefer to maintain a primarily financial interest by relying on professional 
management and board members (Maury, 2006). Therefore, we find it necessary to distinguish 
family management from family ownership. 
Family owners tend to pursue the long-term success and prosperity of the firm, often in pursuit 
of transgenerational ownership (Berrone et al., 2012). Unlike non-family managers who have 
limited and effectively unpredictable length of their tenure, family managers and/or board 
members tend to be tied to the firm throughout their life time owing to their familial association 
and emotional attachment to the firms (Gómez-Mejía et al., 2001, 2003), a phenomenon we 
expect to persist regardless of the entrenchment provisions awarded family managers. In other 
words, family executives and directors benefit from a vaguely de facto entrenchment shared by 
family principals and thus have less need for the protections provided by explicit entrenchment 
provisions (Gómez-Mejía et al., 2001). As such, we argue that as family firms increase their 
reliance on family managers, they are likely to prioritize on familial modes of entrenchment and 
less likely to incorporate value-diminishing E-index provisions. 
Additionally, family firm leaders tend to make a concerted effort to build a positive 
organizational image and reputation and avoid questionable or irresponsible business practices 
(Dyer and Whetten, 2006), which can include entrenchment activity. Controlling families 
involved in management, compared to family members that are solely owners, are more visible 
in public eye and are particularly motivated to maintain a positive reputation devoid of perceived 
nepotism (Dyer and Whetten, 2006; Zellweger et al., 2011) which can be disproportionately 
damaged by enacting entrenchment provisions that disproportionately benefit family managers. 
Unlike professional managers, family members cannot switch families if their family firm's 
reputation is damaged. This suggests family owners that are active in management are more 
sensitive to the risks of pursuing familial goals (Dyer and Whetten, 2006). Thus, individuals who 
strongly identify with their organization feel responsible for the organization and exhibit 
productive behaviors to their firms. This is aligned with the residual ownership rights granted to 
non-owner family managers (Chrisman et al., 2004), which we posit provides family managers 
principal claims in the management of the firm beyond their ownership stake. This suggests that 
within family firms, family managers are likely to possess higher levels of identification with the 
firm and thus are likely to have reduced needs for entrenchment provisions, a phenomenon we do 
not expect when family firms primarily rely on non-family managers. 
In comparison, non-family managers in family firms may possess distinctive disincentives for 
tenure, owing to limited opportunities associated with the lack of familial association with the 
owning family and presence of principal-principal agency conflicts between family and non-
family principal groups (Chrisman et al., 2004). To counteract this effect, providing increased 
protections via entrenchment to non-family managers so as to provide them de facto principal 
claims may become necessary to ensure non-family managers' on-going commitment to the firm. 
As a result, we posit that increasing entrenchment provisions in family firms may be helpful in 
attracting and retaining qualified non-family managers when there are relatively few family 
managers. 
Together this suggests that while family ownership may have distinct and non-linear implications 
for both family management and entrenchment, the relationship between family management and 
entrenchment is clearer. In family firms, as the level of family involvement in management or 
board membership increases, so too does the legitimacy and security of family governance, and 
the visibility of family activity. Thus, the value of entrenchment provisions weakens while the 
costs remain the same or, when non-financial consequences are considered, potentially even 
increase. Even when the founding family installs few family members in management and/or 
board, it might be beneficial to the family if interest alignment incentives are provided to non-
family managers in terms of entrenchment provisions. Hence; 
Hypothesis 2 
Family's involvement in management and/or board membership is negatively associated with the 
employment of entrenchment provisions. 
Methods 
Data and sample 
We constructed our data sample by combining multiple data sources in several steps. First, 
among S&P 500 firms, we identify family business members by their last name and their 
generational differences by using the Hoover's database, annual reports in Mergent Online, firm 
websites, and company proxy statements. Measures related to corporate governance and family 
business such as family ownership and family management are obtained from annual reports and 
proxy statements. 
For each family, we looked up the founding and incorporation history to make sure that we 
correctly recorded the founding family's last name. Consistent with previous studies 
investigating publicly traded family firms, the sample comes from the firms listed in S&P500 
(e.g., Anderson and Reeb, 2003a, 2003b, 2004). Missing data lowered the sample size to 386. 
Data is analyzed on a restricted sample of firms based on publicly available data for the years of 
2002, 2004, and 2006 regarding ownership, management, and control variables. 
Second, we gathered firm-level data related to the E-index (Bebchuk et al., 2009) from the 
dataset of Gompers et al. (2003) which was updated with more data by Wharton Research Data 
Services with data from 2002, 2004, and 2006. Third, we matched the data in the first step with 
those of the second step by firm and year. We further obtained various firm level financial and 
accounting data, such as firm revenue, from Compustat, and match them with the dataset. Next, 
we retrieved information regarding institutional investors from the Thomson Reuters Institutional 
Holdings (13F) database and matched them with the dataset. Finally, we incorporated 
information of board size, board independence, average percentage of stock owned by directors, 
and industry adjusted ROA from data compiled by Bhagat and Bolton (2013). As a result, our 
final dataset includes a total of 941 observations of 386 firms in 2002, 2004, and 2006. 
Measures 
Dependent Variable. Our proxy for value-diminishing entrenchment and main dependent 
variable is the E-index (Bebchuk et al., 2009). Following Bebchuk et al. (2009), we calculate an 
aggregate measure of firms' status related to poison pills, classified boards, golden parachutes, 
supermajority requirements, limits to amend bylaws, and limits to amend the corporate charter 
(Gompers et al., 2003; see Appendix for definitions). The E-index is zero if none of the six 
governance rules are followed by a company. A score of six for the E-index means all six 
governance rules are observed. Prior research shows that high score of E-index is related to 
management entrenchment and has negative impact on firm value (Bebchuk et al., 2009). 
Independent Variables. The proxy for the number of family executives and/or directors is family 
member, which reflects the influence of the founding family (Villalonga and Amit, 2009). It is 
coded as zero, if no founding family member serves as managers and/or directors. Family 
member serves as the endogenous continuous regressor which acts as the dependent variable in 
the first stage of our 2SLS-IV models which serve to address endogeneity concerns (Wooldridge, 
2010). Family share is the total ownership of all family members in percentile and family 
share2 is the square term of family share. If the founding family does not possess any 
shareholding positions, family share and family share2 are coded zero. 
Control Variables. We first control for relevant board characteristics. Board independence is the 
ratio of independent directors to board size (Anderson and Reeb, 2004). Independent directors 
who have no material connections with the company except for board membership 
(e.g. Anderson and Reeb, 2004) can directly influence the status of the E-index (Bebchuk et al., 
2009). Director Share is the average stock ownership of directors. By incorporating the impact 
of the ownership of directors into our analyses, we control for a potential argument that some 
directors could be more influential than others in the decision-making processes of the board 
(Bhagat and Bolton, 2013). 
We then consider the impact of firm performance and various specific firm 
characteristics. Adjusted ROA (Bhagat and Bolton, 2013), is the difference between a firm's ROA 
of the current year and the industry average ROA of the same year. We employ adjusted ROA to 
account for the impact of firm performance on the corporate governance choices (Bhagat and 
Bolton, 2013). Leverage is defined as long-term debt divided by total common equity. Leverage 
can mitigate the managerial agency problems (Jensen, 1986) and therefore is an important factor 
related to firm value (e.g., Stráska and Waller, 2010). R&D, or R&D intensity is a common 
control variable in corporate governance research, calculated as R&D expense over revenue 
(Stráska and Waller, 2010). Firm size is the log of firm revenue and a proxy for firm size. We 
utilize firm size not only to control for a potential determinant of family influence but also to 
incorporate a firm-specific factor into our analyses of firms' choice regarding the E-index 
(Bebchuk et al., 2009). Firm age is measured as the number of years between the inception of the 
firm and the current year of observation. Firm agetakes into account the impact of family tenure 
(Gómez-Mejía et al., 2007). Delaware is a dummy which equals to 1 if the firm is incorporated 
in the state of Delaware, and 0 otherwise. Delaware helps reflect the legislative regulations of 
takeover associated with the state of Delaware where a majority of Fortune 500 firms 
incorporated (Daines, 2001). 
We further account for the impact of large institutional investors because they have the power to 
influence management (Johnson et al., 2010) and may play an active role in proposing corporate 
governance decisions regarding antitakeover defense (Gillan and Starks, 2000). Specifically, we 
employ top5 institutional and top10 institutional respectively to indicate the total ownership of 
the five and ten largest institutional investors. 
In our analyses, we specifically incorporate the influence of generational majority in 
management and board since family influence tends to be weaker when later generations of the 
family are involved and family ownership becomes more dispersed (Schulze et al., 2003; 
Gómez-Mejía et al., 2007). Second generation, a dichotomous variable, takes the value of 1 if a 
majority of family members who are managers and/or directors are of second generation or later. 
Non-family firms and family firms that have a majority of first generation family managers 
and/or directors are coded as zero. Second generation also functions as the instrumental variable 
(IV) in our 2SLS-IV models. Prior literature suggests that family ownership is associated with 
the presence of family members in the management and board of directors (e.g., Villalonga and 
Amit, 2009). However, we have no theoretical reason to believe that family firms of the second 
generation or later will be significantly different from non-family firms in terms of their 
propensity to protect management. Therefore, we believe second generation is a viable 
instrumental variable. 
Lastly, we control for industry and year fixed effects. We follow Chrisman et al. (2012) to 
measure industry fixed effects by classifying all firms into one of four industrial categories: (1) 
retail, (2) service, (3) manufacturing, and (4) other. We then employ three dummy variables 
which are coded as 1 to indicate retail, service, and manufacturing firms respectively, and 0 
otherwise. We use two dichotomous variables to respectively indicate that the current firm-year 
observation reflects information of 2002 and 2004, two years of our three-year total sample. 
Estimation strategies 
We adopt standard OLS model to test our baseline models which we assume to be free of 
endogeneity issues. To formally test our hypotheses, we rely on 2SLS-IV models with family 
member as the continuous endogenous regressor. In the first-stage of the models, family 
member serves as the dependent variable and other exogenous independent variables such 
as family share, control variables and second generation (instrumental variable) are put into 
analyses. In the second stage of the models, the predicted value of family member which we 
obtain from the first-stage is fitted as an independent variable along with other exogenous 
independent variables and control variables (Wooldridge, 2010). To overcome potential 
heteroscedasticity and firm fixed effects in our dataset, we use robust standard errors together 
with year and industry dummies (Peterson, 2009). 
Results 
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics and a pairwise correlation matrix of main variables in 
Models 2 and 3. Family member, family share, and family share2 respectively have a negative 
and significant correlation with the E-index. Family member positively correlates with family 
share and family share2 at the 0.1% level. Second generation has a negative correlation with 
family member at the 0.1% level. 
Table 1. Summary statistics and pairwise correlation table. 
  
Mea
n 
S.D
. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
1 E-index 2.21 0.0
4 
              
2 Family 
member 
0.31 0.0
3 
−0.18∗
∗∗ 
             
3 family 
share 
0.01 0.0
0 
−0.20∗
∗∗ 
0.68∗∗∗ 
            
4 family 
share2 
0.00 0.0
0 
−0.19∗
∗∗ 
0.53∗∗∗ 0.93∗∗∗ 
           
5 second 
generation 
0.12 0.0
1 
−0.18∗
∗∗ 
0.71∗∗∗ 0.50∗∗∗ 0.36∗∗∗ 
          
6 firm age 62.8
4 
1.4
7 
0.07∗ 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.10∗∗∗ 
         
7 firm size 4.26 0.0
2 
−0.10∗
∗ 
0.01 −0.03 −0.03 0.03 0.21∗∗∗ 
        
8 R&D 0.03 0.0
0 
−0.09∗
∗ 
−0.11∗
∗∗ 
−0.10∗
∗ 
−0.08* −0.10∗
∗ 
−0.22∗
∗∗ 
−0.26∗
∗∗ 
       
9 Delaware 0.57 0.0
2 
0.03 0.00 −0.03 −0.02 −0.03 −0.19∗
∗∗ 
−0.01 0.13∗∗∗ 
      
1
0 
board 
independen
ce 
0.72 0.0
1 
0.19∗∗∗ −0.32∗
∗∗ 
−0.28∗
∗∗ 
−0.22∗
∗∗ 
−0.23∗
∗∗ 
0.12∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗ 0.05† 0.03 
     
1
1 
director 
share 
0.01 0.0
0 
−0.23∗
∗∗ 
0.42∗∗∗ 0.48∗∗∗ 0.42∗∗∗ 0.33∗∗∗ −0.09∗
∗ 
−0.08∗
∗ 
−0.05 0.01 −0.40∗∗∗ 
   
1
2 
adjusted 
ROA 
0.02 0.0
0 
−0.01 0.03 0.06 0.05 0.09 0.00 −0.08∗ −0.08∗
∗ 
0.02 −0.07
∗ 
0.03 
   
1
3 
top5 
institutional 
0.25 0.0
0 
0.06† 0.00 −0.09∗
∗ 
−0.09∗
∗ 
0.02 −0.12∗
∗∗ 
−0.15∗
∗∗ 
0.01 0.07
∗ 
0.06∗ 0.05† −0
.0
3 
  
1
4 
top10 
institutional 
0.35 0.0
0 
0.09∗∗ −0.01 −0.10∗
∗ 
−0.11∗
∗∗ 
0.01 −0.14∗
∗∗ 
−0.18∗
∗∗ 
0.02 0.08
∗ 
0.08∗∗ 0.04 −0
.0
3 
0.97∗∗∗ 
 
1
5 
leverage 0.19 0.0
0 
0.11∗∗∗ −0.04 −0.07∗ −0.05† −0.06† 0.07∗ 0.08∗∗ −0.24∗
∗∗ 
0.01 0.13∗∗
∗ 
−0.0
9∗∗ 
−0
.1
7∗∗
∗ 
0.10∗∗ 0.08∗ 
†p < 0.10. *p < 0.05. **p < 0.01. ***p < 0.001. 
Table 2 reports the results of the OLS regression models and 2SLS-IV models which take family 
member as the endogenous regressor. Model 1 is an OLS model that has E-index as the 
dependent variable and analyzes the relationship among family share, family member, and E-
index. The result suggests that none of these have a significant relationship with E-index, if we 
ignore the endogeneity issue, or the influence of family ownership on the number of family 
members who hold managerial and/or board positions. Model 2 is an OLS model that 
employs family member as the dependent variable and analyzes the relationship between family 
share and family member. The result of Model 2 is consistent with H1a: The coefficient of family 
share is positive and significant (β = 15.06, p-value<0.1%) and the coefficient of family 
share2 is negative and significant (β = −30.74, p-value<0.1%). 
Table 2. Results of empirical analysis. 
DV Model 
1 
Model 2 Model 3 (2SLS-IV) Model 4 (2SLS-IV) 
(OLS) (OLS) Stage I Stage II Stage I Stage II 
E-index Fam. 
Member 
Fam. 
Member 
E-index Fam. 
Member 
E-index 
Constant 2.29∗∗∗ 0.31 0.36 2.45∗∗∗ 0.31 2.45∗∗∗  
(0.45) (0.19) (0.22) (0.47) (0.19) (0.48) 
Family member 0.04 
  
−0.32∗∗∗ 
 
−0.47∗∗  
(0.07) 
  
(0.12) 
 
(0.15) 
Family share 3.17 15.06∗∗∗ 6.72∗∗∗ 1.23 15.06∗∗∗ 10.83∗  
(3.03) (2.39) (0.89) (1.55) (2.39) (4.29) 
Family share2 −16.19† −30.74∗∗∗ 
  
−30.74∗∗∗ −31.83∗∗  
(9.00) (7.62) 
  
(7.62) (11.06) 
Firm age 0.00∗ 0.00 0.00 0.00∗ 0.00 0.00∗  
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Firm size −0.31∗∗∗ 0.01 0.01 −0.31∗∗∗ 0.01 −0.30∗∗∗  
(0.09) (0.03) (0.03) (0.09) (0.03) (0.09) 
R&D −2.63∗∗∗ 0.06 −0.08 −2.74∗∗∗ 0.06 −2.60∗∗∗  
(0.78) (0.26) (0.27) (0.77) (0.26) (0.77) 
Delaware 0.14 0.05 0.04 0.15† 0.05 0.17∗  
(0.08) (0.03) (0.03) (0.08) (0.03) (0.08) 
Board 
independence 
0.99∗∗ −0.47∗∗ −0.48∗∗ 0.80∗ −0.47∗∗ 0.75∗ 
(0.31) (0.16) (0.16) (0.32) (0.16) (0.33) 
Director share −20.78∗∗ 4.54 4.11 −19.51∗∗ 4.54 −18.47∗∗  
(7.01) (3.22) (3.28) (6.55) (3.22) (6.61) 
Adjusted ROA 0.03 −0.70∗∗ −0.75∗∗ −0.27 −0.70∗∗ −0.33 
 
(0.57) (0.25) (0.26) (0.60) (0.25) (0.60) 
Leverage 0.26 0.13 0.10 0.28 0.13 0.32  
(0.36) (0.11) (0.12) (0.35) (0.11) (0.35) 
Top5 institutional −7.48∗∗∗ −0.70 −0.86 −7.89∗∗∗ −0.70 −7.84∗∗∗ 
(2.15) (0.92) (0.96) (2.12) (0.92) (2.13) 
Top10 
institutional 
6.62∗∗∗ 0.54 0.70 6.96∗∗∗ 0.54 6.90∗∗∗ 
(1.73) (0.88) (0.92) (1.72) (0.88) (1.74) 
Second Gen −0.56∗∗ 1.10∗∗∗ 1.28∗∗∗ 
 
1.10∗∗∗ 
 
(0.18) (0.11) (0.11) 
 
(0.11) 
 
Industry Dum. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dum Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F statistics 8.56∗∗∗ 32.28∗∗∗ 32.73∗∗∗ 10.28∗∗∗ 32.28∗∗∗ 10.82∗∗∗ 
Adjusted R2 0.13 0.68 0.66 0.12 0.68 0.11 
† p < 0.10; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001; Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
Models 3 and 4 are two-stage least squares models with family member as the endogenous 
regressor. Family member acts as the endogenous variable in Models 3 and 4. In the first 
stage, family member is regressed against all exogenous regressors and second generation, the 
instrumental variable. In the second stage, the fitted value of family member derived from the 
first stage, together with other regressors of the first stage model except for second 
generation act as regressors of E-index. 
Model 3 tests the direct effect of family ownership. The result suggests that family sharedoes not 
significantly impacts E-index, if we don't consider a potential curvilinear relationship. Model 4 
confirms H1a as it shows that the relationship between family shareand family member is an 
inverted U. On the one hand, the direct effect of family share on family member is positive and 
significant (β = 15.06, p-value<0.1%); On the other hand, the curvilinear relationship 
between family share and family member, as represented by the coefficient of family share2, is 
negative and significant (β = −30.74, p-value<0.1%). In other words, the first stage of Model 4 
shows that, on the one hand, at the low to medium level of family ownership, the number of 
family delegates as managers and/or directors increases with the level of family ownership; on 
the other hand, at the medium to high level of family ownership, less powerful family owners 
have relatively more delegates as managers and/or directors than their counterparts with more 
shareholding positions. 
Moreover, model 4 considers the curvilinear relationship between family ownership and E-
index and provides strong support for H1b. As indicated by the positive coefficient of family 
share (β = 10.83, p value < 0.05) and the negative coefficient of family 
share2 (β = −31.83, p value < 0.01) in the second-stage model with E-index as the dependent 
variable, the relationship between family ownership and E-index shows an inverted U shape. 
Fig. 1 illustrates the marginal effect of family ownership on E-index. As shown in the graph, 
when the firm has no family ownership, the predicted value of E-index is 2.15. When family 
ownership is at about the maximum value (the maximum family share in the dataset is 41.24%), 
the E-index is 1.24. The E-index reaches maximum value when family share is between 15% and 
20%, the point where prior research usually suggests that a shareholder reaches control status 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). 
 
 
Fig. 1. Marginal effect of family ownership and E-index provisions. 
In general, these findings suggest that firms with low-to-medium level of family ownership are 
more likely to engage in entrenchment than their counterparts with medium-to-high level of 
family ownership. Models 3 and 4 also support H2. In models 3 and 4, the coefficients of family 
member are negative and significant (β = −0.32, p value < 0.001 in model 
3; β = −0.47, p value < 0.01 in model 4) in the second-stage of the models with E-index as the 
dependent variable respectively. 
Fig. 2 illustrates the marginal effects of the number of family managers and/or board members 
on the presence of E-index provisions. Specifically, when a firm has no family member serving 
as managers and/or directors, the predicted value of E-index is 2.35. When a firm has 4 family 
members serving as managers and/or directors, the E-index is about 1. In our dataset, the 
maximum family member in the data sample is 6. Yet, the results of family member greater than 
4 are not statistically significant. 
 
Fig. 2. Marginal Effect of Family's Involvement in Management and/or Board membership and 
E-Index Provisions. Note: The results of family member greater than 4 are not statistically 
significant. Family member is defined as the number of family executives and/or directors in the 
firm. 
In summary, these results provide strong evidence that family member is negatively correlated 
with entrenchment measured by the E-index. 
To ensure the robustness of our findings and in order to address endogeneity concerns regarding 
our independent variables, we conducted a series of tests to validate the specifications of our 
models. First, we conduct weak identification test by obtaining the Kleibergen-Paap Wald F 
statistic (Kleibergen and Paap, 2006) to check the validity of our instrumental variable, second 
generation. We then compare the result with the critical values suggested by Stock and Yogo 
(2005) and conclude that second generation is a valid instrumental variable. Second, we 
calculate the Kleibergen-Paap LM statistic (Kleibergen and Paap, 2006) to ensure our system of 
equations is correctly identified. The result rejects the null Hypothesis that our models are under 
identified. We then perform the Anderson-Rubin Wald test (Anderson and Rubin, 1949) to verify 
the significance of the coefficient of family member, the endogenous regressor. We find the 
results rejecting the null hypothesis that family member is not significant. Furthermore, we rely 
on the robust score tests, proposed by Wooldridge (1995), to confirm that our family 
member variable is indeed endogenous. 
To verify the robustness of our estimation method, we rerun models 3 and 4 by replacing 2SLS –
IV models with two-stage endogenous Poisson models in order to mitigate the concern that E-
index can be considered as a count variable (Wooldridge, 2010). In unreported analyses, we 
obtain results that are very similar to those reported in models 3 and 4. 
We further explore the robustness of our model specification and instrumental variable. 
Specifically, we rerun models 3 and 4 by dropping top5 institutional from the set of control 
variables. The results are essentially the same as models 2 and 3 except that the coefficients 
of top10 institutional are no longer statistically significant. 
Moreover, we explore the robustness of our instrumental variable and its applicability to 
reconcile endogeneity concerns. Following Semadeni et al.,'s (2014) recommendation of using 
more than one instrumental variable, we add a second one obtained from the Thomson Reuters 
Institutional Holdings (13F) database. The variable is calculated as a Herfindahl index that 
represents the concentration of institutional shareholders (i.e., institutional Herfindahl). In 
unreported analyses, we find that both second generation and institutional Herfindahl are 
strongly correlated with family member, the endogenous independent variable, but are not 
correlated with the residuals of the dependent variable. Furthermore, we respectively test the 
exogeneity of second generation and institutional Herfindahl by calculating the difference-in-
Sargan/Hansen statistic (Wintoki et al., 2012; Hayashi, 2000). The results fail to reject the null 
Hypothesis that either second generationor institutional Herfindahl is exogenous. In all, we 
conclude that our instrumental variable selection is valid and robust because a valid instrumental 
variable should be correlated with the endogenous variable, but should not be correlated with the 
residuals (Semadeni et al., 2014). Moreover, the exogeneity of our instrumental variables is 
confirmed. 
While our primary arguments revolve around the notion that family owners are likely to perceive 
entrenchment through a social lens and thus discuss family ownership as exogenous to 
entrenchment, endogeneity concerns may exist. Endogeneity concerns are common in family 
business research and family ownership specifically is a complex variable with a variety of 
implications on corporate governance. In an attempt to address the potential endogeneity concern 
regarding the family ownership variable, we first rerun the 2SLS –IV analysis of model 4 but 
replace family member with family share which is the endogenous variable in the new model and 
do not consider the quadratic term of family share. In unreported analysis of the whole sample, 
we find that family share has a negative and significant coefficient (β = −8.36, p value < 0.01). 
We further conduct subsample analyses according to family ownership at various thresholds and 
find results consistent with our projected curvilinear relationship between family ownership and 
the E-index. For example, when we partition our data sample at the threshold of 10% for family 
share, we find that the coefficient of family share is positive but statistically nonsignificant for 
the subsample of firms with at least 10% family ownership. Meanwhile, family share has a 
negative and significant relationship with E-index for the subsample of firms with less than 10% 
family ownership. We consider these results consistent with the results of Model 4 
and Fig. 1 even if they do not incorporate the non-linear effect of family ownership. 
We further rerun the 2SLS –IV analysis of model 4 by taking both family share and family 
member as endogenous variables. Following Demsetz and Villalonga (2001), we also add a 
second instrumental variable which is the standard deviation of the firm's stock return of the last 
60 months in this analysis. In unreported analysis, family share has a positive, but statistically 
nonsignificant relationship with E-index (β = 17.65, n.s.) and the coefficient of family member is 
negative, but nonsignificant (β = −0.90, n.s.). We also conduct 3SLS –IV analysis similar to that 
of Bhagat and Bolton (2013). We obtain results that are consistent with those of Model 4, but we 
do not find the impact of family member and family share on E-index to be statistically 
significant. We take cautionary interpretation of the results of our last two robustness checks 
because the R2 of those models is negative, putting a question mark on the model fit. While these 
findings do not wholly alleviate endogeneity concerns within our model, they represent current 
best practices in controlling for endogeneity threats in family business research and the evidence 
from these robustness checks provide no direct evidence contradictory to our main analyses. 
Discussion 
Recent research draws attention to the effects of family involvement (i.e. ownership and 
governance) on the behavior of publicly traded firms (Anderson and Reeb, 2003a, 2003b, 2004; 
Claessens et al., 2002; Villalonga and Amit, 2006, 2009). These efforts have resulted in an 
increased recognition of distinctive characteristics of family governance, but a general lack in 
terms of understanding the mechanisms employed by family owners that allow them to control 
corporations in the ways they do (Villalonga and Amit, 2006, 2009). For instance, controlling 
families' propensity to use different types of governance provisions is widely recognized 
conceptually (see Li and Wang, 2016), but still under researched in extant literature despite these 
recognized idiosyncrasies (Kumar and Zattoni, 2016). We posit that exploring the distinctive 
strategic impetuses of entrenchment provisions in family firms, as well as the relationship 
between family ownership and management, may shed light on the unique principal-principal 
agency relationships in family firms. In an attempt to further our understanding of these 
phenomena, the current research investigates the links among family ownership, family 
governance, and managerial entrenchment. We develop and test a model predicated on principal-
principal agency theory and the socioemotional wealth perspective linking family ownership, 
family's involvement in management and/or board membership with their predilection towards 
entrenchment on a sample of 386 S&P 500 firms via panel data analysis, providing evidence 
supporting our hypothesized model and suggesting multiple implications. 
As hypothesized, we found an inverted u-shaped relationship between family ownership and the 
employment of value-diminishing entrenchment provisions. At lower levels of ownership, family 
owners are more eager to have family managers and/or directors and engage in entrenchment 
activity than those with moderate-to high levels of ownership. However, at higher levels of 
family ownership, we find a noticeable reduction in entrenchment behaviors. This may be a 
result of the family already having substantial control over the business through high levels of 
equity and voting rights which protects their positions without the need for explicit entrenchment 
provisions. In such cases, family owners are less incentivized to be directly involved in firm 
management (e.g. Madison et al., 2017) and would gain relatively less protections from 
traditional avenues of entrenchment compared to firms with lower levels of family ownership. 
Additionally, firms with higher levels of family ownership are likely to be more concerned with 
the firm value owing to family's wealth at stake (Mullins and Schoar, 2016). Therefore, family 
owners with higher levels of ownership may rather prefer highly-competent professional non-
family managers that can be removed in the case of agency conflicts, thus reducing the strategic 
value of entrenchment in general. This finding is in line with Maury (2006), suggesting that 
family ownership may be more beneficial to firm value in legal environments where minority 
shareholders can protect themselves better against family opportunism and where family owners 
participate with significant cash flow rights. 
Additionally, our findings illustrate that as family's involvement in management and governance 
increases, entrenchment provisions become less common. This is contrary to the general view in 
the literature that family firms may be more prone to entrenchment (e.g. Morck and Yeung, 
2003; Sharma, 2004). We suggest this is owing to the fact that controlling families already have 
substantial power, authority, and legitimacy through their participation in the firm, providing a 
de facto protection without the costs and risks associated with explicit entrenchment provisions. 
Indeed, even relatively small percentages of management and board membership provide 
families with a high level of control compared to dispersed minority shareholders with very 
small percentage of ownership and no active participation in management in publicly traded 
family firms (Villalonga and Amit, 2006; Chrisman et al., 2004). This may naturally elevate 
family's representation, authority, power, and legitimacy in decision making (Chrisman et al., 
2012), diminishing the need for the use of value-diminishing power enhancement tools, such as 
the E-index provisions. Additionally, family managers and directors may be less likely to use 
entrenchment provisions owing to the compatibility of their non-economic and economic goals 
(Stewart and Hitt, 2012). For example, non-economic goals such as reputation and continuity of 
family legacy can be complementary to economic goals since a failing and non-reputable 
business will not have much utility to the family. 
In addition to the implications regarding the governance of family firms, our findings may also 
speak to a variety of other implications related to firms' tendency towards entrenchment and 
weak governance controls within family firms ostensibly illustrated by our findings. Weak 
corporate governance can result in stock price decreases which may trigger shareholder lawsuits, 
hostile takeovers, and institutional owners' criticisms in shareholder meetings (Claessens et al., 
2002; Morck and Yeung, 2003); which may create the potential for increased liabilities for 
family principal groups that are overly reliant on family-oriented governance tactics. 
Accordingly, Peng and Jiang (2010) suggest that the impact of family ownership and control on 
firm value is associated with the level of shareholder protection embodied in legal and regulatory 
institutions of a country. When there is effective investor protection, family owners tend to dilute 
their equity to attract minority shareholders and delegate management to professional managers 
(Peng and Jiang, 2010). In this case, family owners and managers and/or directors do not have as 
much incentive to utilize entrenchment provisions to enhance family's power. However, when 
the legal system is weak, family owners want to maintain their control by participating in 
management and/or the board in order to mitigate potential principal-agent agency problems that 
can generate from professional managers' opportunistic behaviors (Peng and Jiang, 2010). This 
suggests a context distinct from our sample and a potential set of secondary outcomes not 
considered in the present research. Future research can build on our findings by investigating 
these phenomena in different regulatory contexts. 
Limitations and future research directions 
While we endeavored to ensure the validity and robustness of our research, we do recognize 
some limitations in the current study which can be used to inform future work in this domain. 
First, as stated above, the regulatory context can affect the observed relationships and 
generalizability to the corporations around the world since the sample included S&P 500 firms 
headquartered in the U.S. Even though increased globalization tends to cause similarities in 
business conduct in world economies, different legal regimes (e.g. common versus civil law) in 
different countries can result in differences in corporate governance (Peng and Jiang, 2010). For 
example, the legal system prevents pyramiding in the US, whereas it is permissible even in many 
developed countries in Asia and Europe (Peng and Jiang, 2010). Hence, since legal context may 
be influential to the findings of this paper, future studies can test or extend the model in other 
countries with different legal systems. 
Similarly, although our panel data analyses examine multiple years (2002, 2004, and 2006) 
which provide the most recent available data regarding relevant governance provisions were 
available, our findings may vary in other time periods (e.g. in 1990s) owing to the changes in the 
legal system. For example, the examined time periods in this paper involves the enactment of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002, also known as Investor Protection Act, as a reaction to corporate 
accounting scandals and the aftermath of its enactment. This act enhanced the reliability of 
financial reporting, transparency, and accountability through increased internal controls and 
auditing (Coates, 2007). Hence, future research can compare or contrast the findings of this 
paper to earlier periods. This can also show whether legislation affects corporate governance. On 
the other hand, we believe our hypotheses would be the same, if we were able to include data 
post 2006. Prior studies have found that firms keep antitakeover-defense-related governance 
provisions relatively stable after 2002 (e.g., Bebchuk et al., 2009). Bebchuk et al. 
(2013) document that the connection between governance indices and firm value persists during 
the post-SOX period. Therefore, family owners should have the same connections with the E-
index provisions as we hypothesized because the impacts of the E-index provisions on the firm 
are unlikely to change. 
Potential endogeneity concerns might exist in our analysis with regard to the use of family 
ownership as an exogenous independent variable to study entrenchment (the dependent variable) 
due to reverse causality. We believe that reverse causality is not a major threat to our research for 
two reasons. First, taking family ownership as exogenous is an established norm in the study of 
family business corporate governance (e.g. Zellweger et al., 2011). Second, and more 
importantly, the impact of entrenchment on family ownership is theoretically ambivalent and 
dependent on how entrenchment is measured relative to firm value and its corresponding impacts 
on the owning family. The entrenchment of the founding family can have two contrasting effects. 
On the one hand, entrenchment allows the founding family to pursue private benefits that hurts 
firm value and proportionally the wealth of the family; on the other hand, the private benefits 
that the founding family obtains as a result of entrenchment increase the wealth of the family. 
Therefore, whether entrenchment should prompt the founding family to increase or decrease its 
ownership should be dependent on the firm value impact of entrenchment rather than 
entrenchment itself. Thus, the impact of family entrenchment on family ownership is more likely 
an empirical concern. Moreover, the nature of E-index provisions allows us to believe that 
founding family ownership should be one of the antecedents of governance provisions such as 
the E-index provisions rather than the other way around (Field and Karpoff, 2002). Specifically, 
major elements of the E-index such as classified board, supermajority requirement, limit to 
amend bylaw, and limit to amend corporate charter require shareholder approval 
(Sundaramurthy, 1996; Walsh and Seward, 1990). As a result, the founding family's attitude 
towards the E-index provisions should make the family rely on its ownership to influence the 
adoption of those provisions and the E-index provisions are unlikely to trigger the change of 
family ownership. 
We also address the potential endogeneity concerns through post-hoc empirical tests. 
Specifically, we conduct a battery of post-hoc robustness tests using valid instrumental variables 
that suggest that endogeneity is not a major threat to our findings. While these tests reinforce the 
robustness of our findings, they do not completely eliminate endogeneity concerns. Therefore, 
future research may develop measures that may also reflect familial entrenchment practices not 
linked to the E-index which can provide further insight into these phenomena. 
In this paper, the links between the components of involvement (i.e. family ownership and 
family's involvement in management and/or the board) and the use of the E-index provisions are 
examined. However, according to the essence approach in defining family firms, the intentions, 
vision, familiness, and/or behaviors may be the distinctive factors distinguishing a family firm 
from not only a nonfamily firm, but also other family firms (Chrisman et al., 2005). Since the 
elements of the essence approach are expected to lead to differences in corporate governance 
systems in family firms, the link between such family influence and the use of entrenchment 
behaviors can be investigated. Doing so would speak towards calls for investigating the 
heterogeneity of family firms in corporate governance research (e.g. Siebels and Knyphausen, 
2012). 
Conclusion 
The present study applies agency theory, socioemotional wealth, and corporate governance 
perspectives to family ownership and family's involvement in management and/or the board in 
corporations and their entrenchment activity. The model examined in this paper enhances our 
understanding of the family dynamics that play an important role in corporations owned and/or 
managed by families within the scope of managerial entrenchment. Our findings contribute to 
on-going research regarding the corporate governance of family firms and suggest that 
entrenchment may possess a unique strategic impetus in family firms by providing an avenue for 
the pursuit of family-oriented outcomes related to retained control and power based on the 
entrenchment of family managers. However, as family governance becomes ubiquitous, the 
power of the controlling family lessens the need for explicit E-index entrenchment provisions. 
Appendix. 
Entrenchment Index (E-index) Provisions (Bebchuk et al., 2009) 
Staggered Board A board in which directors are divided into separate classes (typically 
three) with each class being elected to overlapping terms. 
Limitation on 
Amending Bylaws 
A provision limiting shareholders' ability through majority vote to amend 
the corporate bylaws. 
Limitation on 
Amending the 
Charter 
A provision limiting shareholders' ability through majority vote to amend 
the corporate charter. 
Supermajority to 
Approve a Merger 
A requirement that requires more than a majority of shareholders to 
approve a merger. 
Golden Parachutes A severance agreement that provides benefits to management/board 
members in the event of firing, demotion or resignation following a 
change in control. 
Poison Pill A shareholder right that is triggered in the event of an unauthorized change 
in control that typically renders the target company financially unattractive 
or dilutes the voting power of the acquirer. 
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